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Neurostimulation techniques have con-
tributed to neural models of motor, cog-
nitive, affective and volitional functions
by elucidating their biophysical under-
pinning. Deep brain stimulation (DBS)
is particularly significant in this regard
because it can both probe and modu-
late activity in dysfunctional neural cir-
cuits in patients with neurological and psy-
chiatric disorders (Lozano and Lipsman,
2013) These are increasingly being under-
stood as disorders caused by overactivity
or underactivity in critical nodes of these
circuits. DBS can restore circuit integrity
in motor disorders such as Parkinson’s dis-
ease and mood disorders such as major
depression when they have been resistant
to pharmacological treatment. Unilateral
or bilateral stimulation of the subthala-
mic nucleus and globus pallidus interna
to modulate dysfunction in the basal gan-
glia has resulted in significant improve-
ment in motor function for many patients
with Parkinson’s and other movement dis-
orders. Although it is still experimental for
treating psychiatric disorders, stimulation
modulating overactive regions of the pre-
frontal cortex and underactive regions of
the subcortical reward system has resulted
in improved mood and relief of anhedo-
nia and avolition in some patients with
depression.
Yet by altering functions in the neu-
ral circuits that mediate mental and motor
capacities, DBS challenges the philosophi-
cal conviction that we have conscious con-
trol of our behavior. In addition, by alter-
ing the properties associated with mood
and motivation, DBS may undermine the
unity and continuity of the psychological
properties that make each of us a unique
person. Even when the therapeutic benefits
of stimulating the brain outweigh the risks
of adverse neurological and psychological
effects, it raises metaphysical and ethical
questions about agency and identity.
Many philosophers argue that agency
presupposes that our actions are not gen-
erated by causal routes that bypass con-
scious control of the mental states that
issue in them (Mele, 1995, 2009; Fischer
and Ravizza, 1998, p. 236). Presumably,
this would include manipulation of the
brain by an artificial implanted device
(Klaming and Haselager, 2013). The fact
that a device can regulate a wide range
of functions might suggest that it is not
the person but the device that controls the
person’s thought and behavior. Because
of its role in restoring and maintain-
ing circuit integrity, the stimulator seems
to introduce a “third party” that comes
between what the patient believes is a
direct connection between their brain and
mind (Lipsman and Glannon, 2013). This
appears to diminish if not exclude the
causal role of one’s conscious mental states
in one’s actions. Yet neurostimulation does
not threaten but can restore the relevant
control when it has been lost or impaired
from a neurological or psychiatric disor-
der. By ensuring that the neural circuits
mediating motor, cognitive, affective and
volitional functions are neither overactive
nor underactive, the modulating effects of
DBS can release constraints on the ability
to initiate and execute action plans. Insofar
as the stimulation generates mental states
that one endorses as the genuine springs of
one’s actions, it ensures that the actions are
autonomous and that one can be respon-
sible for them. Moreover, insofar as the
stimulating system integrates with circuits
regulating somatosensory and propriocep-
tive feedback from the body to the brain, it
can restore the phenomenology of agency,
the feeling of being in control of one’s
actions.
In DBS for Parkinson’s, the fact that
modulation of neural circuits operates
outside of conscious awareness does not
undermine control of motor functions.
This is because the implicit knowledge
that the electrodes are implanted and acti-
vated in the brain does not figure in the
explicit content of the patient’s aware-
ness when unreflectively and automati-
cally performing bodily movements. One
need not be aware of being in control
to actually be in control of one’s actions.
Similarly, individuals with major depres-
sion or obsessive-compulsive disorder are
not aware of the electrodes modulating
neural circuits and associated cognitive
and affective processes. Complementary
conscious and unconscious processes reg-
ulated by re-entrant loops in cortical and
subcortical networks are necessary to con-
trol thought and behavior (Spence, 2009).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a good
illustration of this point. Individuals with
this disorder are inhibited in perform-
ing actions they used to perform as a
matter of course due to hyper-reflective
thought caused by dysfunction in frontal-
striatal pathways mediating cognitive and
motor functions (Fuchs, 2011). DBS can
re-establish normal activity in these path-
ways and release individuals from the par-
alyzing obsessions and compulsions that
characterize this disorder. Theoretically,
it does not matter whether mental and
motor functions are generated and sus-
tained by a natural or artificial system.
Provided that an artificial system such as
DBS connects in the right way with the
neural inputs and outputs that regulate
behavior, it can ensure that one is the agent
and in control of the relevant functions.
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Nevertheless, overstimulating circuits
at higher frequencies, or stimulating the
wrong circuits, can cause a different
pathology with equally disabling effects
on agency. Some individuals receiving
DBS for Parkinson’s disease have regained
motor control but have developed com-
pulsive and addictive behavior because
nodes of the reward system were inad-
vertently overstimulated (Muller and
Christen, 2011; Castrioto et al., 2014).
A similar effect has occurred in some
patients with depression, where overstim-
ulation of the reward system has resulted
in hypomania and mania (Christen et al.,
2012; Synofzik et al., 2012). Neural targets
must be carefully selected and stimulation
parameters adjusted in response to brain
changes and neurological and psychologi-
cal symptoms tomaintain optimal levels of
neural and mental functions. Stimulation
must sustain the neural and psychological
mean between extremes.
The concern about DBS altering the
psychological properties constitutive of
diachronic personal identity is particu-
larly germane to psychiatric disorders.
The effects of stimulation can disrupt the
unity and continuity of the properties
in virtue of which one experiences one-
self persisting through time as the same
individual (Parfit, 1984). When one has
experienced depression for years, one may
gradually come to identify with the defin-
ing symptoms of the disorder as form-
ing the core of one’s self. In most cases,
though, patients want to rid themselves
of these symptoms and reclaim the phe-
nomenology and content of the mental
states they had before the onset of the
disorder. It is not stimulation but the dis-
order that disrupts connections between
the psychological properties constituting
one’s self by generating pathological states
of mind. Stimulation can cause salutary
changes in thought and behavior con-
gruent with what one desires and would
endorse as one’s own. DBS can thus re-
establish the person’s identity (Witt et al.,
2013). Indeed, the stimulating system itself
becomes part of one’s identity because
the patient can perceive it as an enabling
device that becomes integrated into his
or her brain and mind (Lipsman and
Glannon, 2013). Instead of an alien object,
it can be described as a form of extended or
expanded embodiment. The poor mood,
anxiety and lack of motivation character-
istic of many psychiatric disorders are ego-
dystonic in the sense that there is incon-
gruity between one’s actual states and
those one wants to have. Individuals with
these disorders may feel that their body
andmind have been hijacked by a dysfunc-
tional brain. The insight associated with
this experience can motivate them to seek
therapy in the form of DBS, whose mod-
ulating effects can restore the psycholog-
ical properties of their pre-morbid selves.
Adverse effects of stimulation such as
mania or suicidal ideation would preclude
insight into the disorder and be equally
disruptive of identity because they would
be equally incongruent with the proper-
ties a healthy individual would persistently
endorse over time. This again underscores
the need for careful use of neurostimula-
tion in targeting the right circuits with the
right frequency to produce optimal levels
of mental and physical functions.
To be sure, the often rapid and sub-
stantial changes in personality and behav-
ior from DBS can make for a difficult
period of adjustment for both patients
and caregivers who have become accus-
tomed to a chronic pattern of symptoms.
Still, provided that the changes are ben-
eficial and improve their quality of life,
it clearly would be preferable to have to
adjust to what is essentially a restora-
tion of the patient’s real self than to con-
tinue dealing with the challenges of living
with a mentally and physically disabling
pathology. Technological advances, such
as closed loop devices that can recali-
brate in response to changes in the brain
while circuits are being stimulated, will
reduce the incidence of adverse effects and
be more tailored to individualized ther-
apy in maximizing benefit andminimizing
harm. By modulating dysfunctional neural
circuits associated with neurological and
psychiatric disorders, DBS can restore the
motor and mental functions necessary for
autonomous agency and the mental states
with which one would want to identify.
The ability of DBS to probe and mod-
ulate neural circuits and alter the mental
states associated with agency and iden-
tity has a deeper metaphysical implication.
The fact that these states have a neural
underpinning casts doubt on the idea of
an immaterial human soul. Alteration of
higher conscious perception by a millivolt
of electrical current confirms the material
nature of our consciousness (Churchland,
2013). DBS not only validates that neuro-
logical and psychiatric disorders are disor-
ders of neural circuitry but also that the
very nature and content of our mental
states depends on the function or dysfunc-
tion of these circuits.
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